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more they questioned and learned, the less they understood. A gnawing doubt became a growing awareness of the fundamental absurdity of ourinvolvement, and then gradually the realization spread that the establishment was out of its mind. It was America's good fortune that the insanity of its leaders could be checked by the common sense of a few million skeptics.
Leaders do not usually appreciate this built-in restriction on their power to wreck the system, and Richard M. Nixon was one who became increasingly vexed as the descent of his administration to new depths of political morality was made evident by the media and then finally halted by public outrage and Congressional power. The irony of the Watergate fiasco was that Nixon ran on a "Law and order" platform in 1968, but four years later, his campaign was characterized by burglary, bribery, forgery, perjury and obstruction of justice. Even this litany of crimes would have come to naught politically had executive sessions in the Oval Office not been taped and the tapes retained. It was the combination of these incredibly stupid blunders with the crimes themselves which led to the President's resignation. As might be expected, groupthink played a major role in this debacle, and members of the White House staff did indeed share the overoptimism and sense of invulnerability common to groupthinkers living in an unreal world defined by their own separate, narrow, closed standard of immorality. As usual, when people are absolutely devoted to their plan, cause and themselves, warnings of impending disaster were ignored. This failure to heed warnings was due to both the nature of the Nixonian schema and the tenacity with which it was held by loyal staff members. The schema itself was basically one of methodology—specifically, that any creepy means could be employed to maintain the image of the hollow administration. This was the subconscious guide for strategy and behavior which was shared by the Nixon staff and which led them to perceive the Watergate scandal as a public relations problem. In doing so, they were at least consistent: they perceived everything as a public relations problem. The impact of this schema's limitations was compounded by the persistence of the President's staff in adhering to it despite its obvious draw-backs. At every stage of the Watergate morass, there was a consistent failure of those involved to face irrefutable facts even when they were known to be irrefutable. With all signs indicating failure, loyal staff members carried on very much as usual and so validated the signs. If there is a lesson to learn from this pocket review of history, it must be that stupidity flourishes with ageless consistency. It is sad to note that it is as common in modern America as it has ever been anywhere.
 stupidity.com 
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